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N

orwegian People’s Aid (NPA) has been operational
in improvised explosive device (IED) clearance in
Hamdaniya, Iraq, since January 2017. Additionally,

MAG (Mines Advisory Group) has operated in the same area
clearing IEDs since September 2015 and has had operations
in many parts of both Iraq and Syria. Other nongovernmental organizations (NGO) clearing IEDs include Handicap
International and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action
(FSD). Without question, IED clearance is now an established
part of humanitarian mine action (HMA). Yet this does not
mean HMA should adopt the full spectrum of IED disposal (IEDD) operations. Rather, NGOs can provide invaluable
capacity only within the appropriate humanitarian context.

IEDs on the Battlefield

IEDs have long been a part of the battlefield mix of explo-

sive hazards, from simple, modified munitions to complex,
multi-switch devices. In conflicts, these devices are typically neutralized by specialized military and/or police teams.
However, not every device is found, so IEDs inevitably end up
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This kerosene heater was modified into an IED that incorporates both a
crush necklace and a built-in, anti-lift feature. These devices and others
like them are sitting among the rubble inside abandoned homes awaiting returning families.
All photos courtesy of NPA.

IED Proliferation in Iraq and Syria

IED deployment methodologies changed dramatically

as a part of the explosive contamination left behind after the

when ISIS broke out of Syria and swept through a massive

shooting stops. Consequently, HMA actors have a long his-

swath of Iraq in 2014. IEDs became a main strategic tool in

tory of dealing with booby-trap scenarios involving modified

both offense and defense. Using captured factories and ma-

munitions, such as in the Balkans, or abandoned IEDs, such

chinery, ISIS began making improvised landmines, rockets,

as in southern Afghanistan. This was generally executed as

mortars, fuses, and grenades—some of which are complete

incidental encounters during unexploded ordnance (UXO) or

one-off designs—while others are surprisingly decent copies

mine clearance but not the main effort. However, the battle-

of state-produced munitions. The sheer scale and variety of

field is evolving, and HMA must grow with it.

IED production and deployment is astounding.

The successes of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention

Arguably the most popular design with ISIS is the pressure-

(APMBC) and munition stockpile reduction projects have

plate IED (PPIED). Although it looks nothing like a mine, it

limited the availability of these weapons to nonstate actors.

is commonly deployed with the same tactical intent as a tra-

In the beginning of the insurgency campaigns in Afghanistan

ditional mine.

and Iraq, IEDs tended to use main charges of unexploded pro-

The PPIED consists of two plates held apart by spacers.

jectiles or other factory-produced ordnance. When the stock

When these plates touch from pressure, the circuit is closed,

of munitions ran out, the bomb makers turned to homemade

firing an electric detonator. The detonator can be commercial

explosive (HME) for main charges. By manufacturing HME

or also improvised. Certainly this is a very simple yet effec-

from common precursors such as aluminum, urea, ammo-

tive device. The main charges are made from just about any

nium nitrate, and potassium chlorate, the bombers created a

available container from fuel jugs to tea kettles, or they can

nearly inexhaustible supply chain.

be made by ISIS from industrial pipes, gas cylinders, or other
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The rubble from an adjacent IED detonation makes the crush necklace
even harder to see.

assault from security forces. Command IEDs can be found interspersed at key points inside the protective row as well.
An anti-personnel mine, as defined by the APMBC and
the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended
Protocol II, is “a munition designed to be placed under, on or
A typical PPIED with dual pressure plates. The national staff searchers
have marked it for the IED specialists to prosecute.

near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by
the presence, proximity or contact of a person” intended to
“incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”1,2 The treaty definitions say nothing about the munitions being factory made, meaning a victim-operated (VOIED) placed on the
ground or another surface area is an anti-personnel mine under the scope of these definitions, their respective treaties and
international humanitarian law.
Another common tactic is to place IEDs inside houses in
the perimeter of the village and in large defensible structures
such as schools and hospitals. Some of these IEDs are well disguised as seemingly harmless objects. NPA has encountered
generators and kerosene heaters repurposed as VOIEDs in

The same PPIED after neutralization. Note the square, white electronic
anti-lift device on the left.

several houses. The primary switching is small contact beads

repurposed material. Typical net explosive quantity (NEQ)

pressure plates in a row. The commonly used name for this de-

ranges from 6 to 20 kg (13 to 44 lbs), although much larger

sign is crush necklace (although many other names are used).

charges have been found when targeting vehicles. Secondary

These crush necklaces can be several meters long and snake

anti-lift features are common, as are dual pressure plates. If on

around doors and stairways.

the surface, even a child’s footstep is enough pressure to function the device.

at intervals of fine copper wire, essentially multiple miniature

The wires are usually enameled or painted to match concrete and are hard to see. So far, every device of this category

Yet the charges are powerful enough to destroy a truck and

that NPA neutralized has also contained at least one second-

kill the occupants. PPIEDs currently encountered in Iraq are

ary switch targeting the clearance agent. Crush necklaces are

generally robust in design and can remain functional for several

also found with other types of main charges. When deployed

years. Other improvised mines, which mimic factory-produced

on hard surfaces, the target is personnel, and on soft ground,

mines in form as well as function, use mechanical cocked-

the target is vehicles.

striker fuzing, and these may have even longer operational

Security forces conducted clearance as they breached

lifespans than electronically-fired systems. ISIS deploys these

through, but the quality of the clearance is not to interna-

improvised mines in long, patterned rows to defend against

tional standards and the mapping is nonexistent. The vast
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majority of devices remain in situ, especially the massive rows
of improvised mines. The precise amount of contamination is

IED that is at play within the active battlefield, humanitar-

not known, but a reasonable estimate is that over 50 percent

ian intervention is inappropriate because it would raise ques-

of communities in the areas liberated from ISIS in Iraq have

tions regarding the humanitarian principles of neutrality and

large-scale IED contamination. While the original target was

impartiality. This is not specific to an IED context but equal-

security forces, today the victims of these IEDs are the dis-

ly applies to a classic minefield. A humanitarian mine ac-

placed people who are returning home to rebuild their lives.

tion operator would never enter into a conflict zone to clear

Humanitarian Response

a minefield that one side of the conflict is actively defending
or maintaining.

The humanitarian crisis created by these IEDs is hard to

Therefore, if there was ongoing IED deployment or over-

fully comprehend. A massive swath of Iraq and Syria was laid

watch in an area, it would be inappropriate for a humanitar-

waste and booby-trapped. IEDs lurk among the rubble, along

ian operator to intervene as it could, in legal terms, potentially

roads and power lines, inside abandoned houses and govern-

constitute direct participation in the conflict.

ment buildings, and in agricultural fields.
Some groups within the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
and mine action community have questioned the capability of

The HMA Role in IED Clearance

For HMA, the most appropriate environment for opera-

HMA NGOs to clear IEDs. While some of this is an obvious

tions is post-conflict or in a theater where active combat is

ploy to corner the market, the question is nevertheless valid

not taking place. This allows HMA to focus on giving support

and should be discussed openly. Whether NGOs can conduct

to those who are most vulnerable and meeting the needs of

IED clearance effectively has been proven on the ground al-

the civilian population and returnees. Thus, HMA focuses on

ready. So perhaps the correct discussion is how and why we

three main types of clearance with respect to IEDs: hazardous

are operating. The discussion begins by acknowledging two

areas, booby-trapped structures, and spot tasks.

crucial differences in NGO capacity versus security forces and
commercial companies.

Hazardous areas of VOIEDs are improvised minefields,
and HMA NGOs are the leading actors in mine clearance and

First, HMA NGOs are impartial and not in the fight.

its associated survey and information management (IM). By

HMA deployment is non-tactical and engages directly with

adapting current best practices in mine clearance, operators

the affected community. The teams are neither intended nor

can efficiently locate and remove the devices and return the

equipped to deploy full security cordons or engage defensive-

resource back to the community. Like traditional mine clear-

ly. Deployment is planned in areas far enough away from the

ance, most of the effort is expended in identifying the areas

frontline to reduce the probability of being targeted or being

and searching for the devices.

caught in an engagement.

Unlike traditional mine clearance, the improvised nature of

Second, NGOs do not use armor, electronic counter mea-

the threat requires IEDD-qualified staff to deal with even the

sures (ECM), fully remote procedures, and security cordons.

most apparently simple device. NGOs and commercial com-

Thus active command or time devices fall outside the scope of

panies both employ former military personnel to provide this

HMA work. NPA applies a sufficient soak time (period of time

capacity. HMA must be vigilant in keeping improvised mine

observed in order to allow active sensors to run down and

clearance procedures distinct from traditional mine clear-

timers to expire) to ensure that any lingering fighters have left

ance. Like all mine or UXO clearance, the skills of the team

and that any active timers or power sources have run down.

and equipment required must be adjusted to the threat posed

The remaining devices are then considered to be abandoned

by the devices.

IED and fall into the HMA realm.
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for a humanitarian operator. If the clearance task involves an

Structure clearance is done solely by IED-qualified staff.

But perhaps even more important than how an HMA NGO

High Risk Search techniques created by military IED opera-

deploys in a C-IED role is why. As defined in International

tors are employed, but the tools and methods are compara-

Mine Action Standards (IMAS), HMA projects “should re-

tively low-tech versus proper military teams. Also, given that

flect fundamental humanitarian principles of neutrality,

the intent of HMA is to return land and property back to civil-

impartiality, equality and humanity so that mine action is fo-

ian use, protection of property is even more important with-

cused on giving support to those who are most vulnerable”

in the HMA context, so energetic attacks (disruptors, various

(IMAS 1.10).2 If operators are going to continue to conduct

water explosives, shaped charges, etc.) are less commonly

HMA, the real question is which C-IED tasks are appropriate

used. Buildings are selected based on the resource value to the
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Where HMA stands out is in the long grind of survey and
clearance. HMA developed the land release and toolbox concepts. Land release is a process that coordinates certain types
of survey with clearance and puts the emphasis on survey over
clearance in order to get hazard areas released efficiently and
safely (see IMAS 07.11 for more).
The toolbox concept is a strategy for utilizing mechanical,
manual, and animal systems together to optimize quality and
productivity. Survey of the region and clearance of hazardous
areas is a slow process even in the best conditions. Time is on
the side of NGOs. Taking on the large, complex area clearance
tasks frees up clearance teams from security forces to get back
A row of improvised mines isolated for clearance.

in the fight and do what they do best.

community. For example, NPA has cleared several homes for

Beyond survey and clearance, HMA activities include risk

returnees as well as a large primary school and a large second-

education and community liaison work that have positive in-

ary school in an area 20 km (12 mi) from Mosul.

direct effects on clearance. NGOs train local teams who, in

For HMA, the results are all about the human impact, not

turn, teach local people how to recognize, avoid, and report

just square meters. Spot tasks have changed as well. Before

hazards. The obvious benefit is saved lives. But local reporting

the IED proliferation, an unfired round of ammunition was

also provides a massive boost in information collection and

simply picked up and hauled off. Now in countries such as

task prioritization. Further, NGOs gain community accep-

Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, or Somalia, the same item

tance that can also have security benefits on the ground, par-

must now be evaluated as a potential come-on or IED com-

ticularly in countries that are suspicious of foreign people and

ponent. Further, abandoned command or time devices pop up

organizations.

as spot tasks here and there. These are essentially then treated
as VOIED in case of secondary switching (with some exceptions such as stuck-fast timer). Of course, drills such as Radio
Frequency discipline or wire control are still employed—just
without the worry of an active triggerman or a running timer.

Comparative Strengths and Weaknesses

Security forces, commercial companies, and NGOs each

have a different role to play in the effort to remove explosive
hazards. In some cases, NGOs are not suitable at all. In other cases, NGOs are the best equipped to deliver a solution. In
fact, NPA proposes that the three sectors of IED response,
when working together and sharing information, can achieve
synergy. What is important is to understand our various roles.
As previously mentioned, NGOs cannot, or at least should
not, do front-line clearance or active command or time devices. These scenarios are appropriate for security forces and certain specialized commercial companies.
IED operators take years to develop from scratch, so fast
response requires a large amount of expat skill sets imported
to the mission, and commercial companies can more easily
recruit these operators due to more lucrative compensation.
NGOs are unlikely to win funding for clearance of private
commercial property or military bases, whereas commercial
companies are well suited for these tasks.

This primary school classroom bears the marking from the HRS clearance process.

ISSUE 21.3 @ NOVEMBER 2017

33

and professionally-manufactured munitions available to insurgent groups appears to be a long-term trend that is here to
stay. Without the open backing of a foreign government, the
insurgents’ most likely weapon in the future will continue to
be improvised devices.
NPA and other NGOs have clearly demonstrated that
HMA actors can play a role in IED clearance operations within the appropriate humanitarian context. The question is not
whether HMA actors can address active command or timed
devices, but whether it is appropriate given their humanitarBeneficiaries of NGO clearance. These children can now return to school
after more than two years without formal education.

Based on the authors' experience in the commercial and
HMA sectors, NGOs are far more cost-effective than forprofit companies. Because NGOs operate at lower costs, and
because they actively work to build self-sustaining national capacity, the value per dollar and sustainability are much better.
However, highly-capitalized commercial companies are more
agile in initial deployment and redeployment than NGOs.

ian mandate. HMA NGOs can always adjust their capacity to
respond appropriately to the threat posed by a device. The
question of where an HMA actor can or cannot operate is not
determined by the type of device but by the scenario in which
the device is found in. Once the conflict is over, NGOs can
move in and devote the months or years needed to return resources back to the communities as part of regaining normalcy after war.
A version of this article first appeared in the Counter-IED
Report, Autumn 2017.
See endnotes page 66

Quality management (QM) in HMA and commercial companies is extremely stringent. There are several tiers of internal
QM, and generally the National Mine Action Authority or the
United Nations Mine Action Service provides external QM.
Security forces, on the other hand, do not have the time or resources to devote to clearance at these high standards.
The final strength of the NGO in this crisis is the value of
the clearance to the community. NPA’s mandate is to restore
access, both directly to the people and to aid agencies trying
to deliver assistance. Other NGOs have similar approaches
that focus on how the IEDs impact communities in order to
prioritize assistance with limited resources.

Looking Forward

HMA actors have been clearing improvised devices and
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conducting house clearance of booby traps for years. We
continue to clear minefields with complex threats including
anti-lift devices, tripwires, or mixes of UXO, landmines, cluster strikes, and improvised landmines. In each specific task,
HMA organizations must analyze the threats and adjust their
training, equipment, and skill set to meet the threat posed by
the mix of devices in each location. In this sense, dealing with
IEDs and improvised landmines is nothing new for HMA actors. What has changed in places like Iraq and Syria is the
scale of the use of IEDs versus traditional factory-produced
munitions. Due to the success of the APMBC and government
efforts to improve physical security and stockpile reduction
projects, the dwindling supply of anti-personnel landmines
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Endnotes
Improvised Explosive Devices and the International Mine Action Standards by Rhodes, Ph.D. [ from page 4 ]
1. An IED is defined as a ‘device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating explosive material, destructive, lethal, noxious, incendiary, pyrotechnic
materials or chemicals designed to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass. They may incorporate military stores, but are normally devised from non-military components’ (IMAS 04.10 3.134: 2013 & IATG 01.40:2011). Those victim–operated devices laid as landmines are referred to in this paper as locally manufactured landmines
or improvised landmines .
2. The phrase ‘Humanitarian Mine Action’ is redundant as Mine Action by definition is humanitarian. In this paper Mine Action is used where others may use the phrase
Humanitarian Mine Action.
3. Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 13.
4. Email correspondence with The Halo Trust. Statistics current to August 2017.
5. Email correspondence with MAG. Statistics current to August 2017.
6. Email correspondence with DAICMA. Statistics current to July 2017.
7. IMAS 01.10 Section 5.
8. IMAS 01.10 Section 6.2.
9. Mine action operators must therefore conduct risk assessments that include proper assessments of the conflict in question and of the actors involved. Such assessments
will examine whether areas being targeted for clearance are permissive environments, where explosive devices are no longer in use for the parties to the conflict, or
whether conflict is ‘active’ in a given area and therefore not appropriate for mine action operations.
10. http://www.mineaction.org/improvised-explosive-device-lexicon.
11. Understanding the Regional and Transnational Networks that Facilitate IED Use, AOAV, 2017.
12. For instance IMAS 09.11 concerns Battle Area Clearance ‘including UXO, AXO, booby traps and failed, or abandoned, IEDs left behind after hostilities have ceased.’
13. IMAS 04.10 and IATG definition: EO - all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs
and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and
dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices (IEDs); and all similar or related items
or components explosive in nature.
14. IMAS 04.10 anti-personnel landmine definition - ‘a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure
or kill one or more persons’. The definition of an anti-personnel mine by virtue of its emphasis on the impact of the munition, as opposed to its construction, includes
mines that have been constructed in an improvised manner. This is well documented in the negotiations for the treaty.
15. See extent of improvised devices from the operational statistics of one mine action operator, MAG: Figures 3 and 4.
16. Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 10.
Quality Management and Standards for Humanitarian Improvised Explosive Device (HIED) Response Activities by Keeley [ from page 9 ]
1. See the UNMAS mine action portal at http://www.mineaction.org/issues.
2. Assuming victim assistance is mainstreamed into health and disability sectors and supported by specialist organizations that may not be involved in the ‘field’ elements of mine action.
3. Based on NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised Explosive Devices, AJP-3.15 (A) March 2011, Para 0418.
4. Based on NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised Explosive Devices, AJP-3.15 (A) March 2011, Para 0419.
5. Based on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 04.10 2nd Edition Amdt 3, Para 3.168.
6. See the explanation of response time analysis in “Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia for the Donor Working Group on Mine Action”, Griffin and Keeley,
2004.
7. “Indemnify.” The Free Dictionary. Accessed 13 September 2017. http://bit.ly/2h1en9C.
Crossing the Fence: Challenges of Operationalizing PSSM by Isikozlu, Krötz, and Trancart [ from page 14 ]
1. Loughran, Chris. “Developing good practice for measuring the success, effectiveness and impact of PSSM”, Manchester: MAG, May 2016. Accessed 4 August 2017.
http://bit.ly/2weqsLy.
2. Other agreements that are in force in the region include the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great
Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa, and Bordering States (2004) and most recently, the Kinshasa Convention (2017).
3. “ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials.” Article 24(1). Accessed 4 August 2017. http://bit.
ly/1wPPgSM.
4. Van der Vondervoort, Luuk and Michael Ashkenazi. “Practices and approaches towards arms and ammunition management in Mali.” Unpublished report. Bonn:
BICC, 2015.
5. Van der Vondervoort, Luuk. “’Guns are for the Government’: An evaluation of a BICC advisory project on state-owned arms control in South Sudan.” BICC Working
paper. Bonn: BICC, 2014.
Promoting Secure Stockpiles and Countering Diversion by Berman and King [ from page 18 ]
1. Any list of partners supporting Small Arms Survey projects would include the Danish Demining Group, The HALO Trust, Handicap International, Mines Advisory
Group, and the United Nations Mines Action Service. Additional partners appear elsewhere in this short article. This list is indicative and not exhaustive.
2. MSAG is an apolitical, informal, and multinational platform of a dozen or so like-minded governments that, to the extent possible, since 2005 have worked together
to support each other’s efforts to improve stockpile management practices across the globe. See www.msag.es.
3. Berman, Eric G., and Pilar Reina. “Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites: Concerns and Consequences.” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action. 16.2 (2012): 4–9.
4. The PSSM Best Practice Cards are available in Albanian, Arabic, Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian (BCMS—in the Latin alphabet), French, Portuguese,
Russian, Spanish, and Swahili.
5. For example, over the past three years, the Survey has added eight incidents and deleted five during the period 1979–2013.
6. See http://bit.ly/2llTGH8.
7. The UEMS Database records 19 events as having occurred in the United States, which have resulted in four dead and two injured. By way of comparison, while casualty data for many incidents is incomplete (including for those in the United States), the average number of casualties recorded for the other 548 UEMS in the 100
other countries in the database comes to more than 50.
8. The RASR Initiative Steering Committee comprises the International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), the RACVIAC Centre for Security Cooperation, the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearing House for the Control of
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), and the Small Arms Survey. The nine participating states since 2009, when the Initiative was launched, include Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia. WRA provided funding from 2009 through 2015. The European
Union is funding RASR for the 2017–2019 period. Moldova has been invited to contribute to the Initiative. For more information. See www.rasrinitaitive.org.
9. Gobinet, Pierre, and Jovana Carapic. “Less Bang for the Buck: Stockpile Management in South-east Europe.” Small Arms Survey 2015: Weapons and the World (2015):
125–155.
10. Parker, Sarah. Facilitating PSSM Assistance in the Sahel and Beyond: Introducing the PSSM Priorities Matrix. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2016.
11. Berman, Eric G., Mihaela Racovita and Matt Schroeder. Making a Tough Job More Difficult: Loss of Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations. Geneva: Small Arms
Survey, 2017.
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